



Local Municipal Function and the District Development Model

Federal Policy Unit
2026




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List of Acronyms

COGTA	Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
DA	Democratic Alliance
DCoG	Department of Cooperative Governance and the Department of Planning
DDM	District Development Model
DLG	Department of Local Government
DPME	Department of Monitoring and Evaluation
GPI	Governance Performance Index
IDP	Integrated Development Plans
IGR	Intergovernmental Relations
JDMA	Joint District and Metro Approach
MFMA	Municipal Finance Management Act

Summary

The DA herein outlines its position on the following matters relating to local government structures and functions:

- 1. The DA rejects the District Development Model' (“DDM”)** in its current form and disagrees with the underlying policy premise of the DDM, which is to give the National Government centralised oversight over local government.
- 2. The DA recognises the deep state of dysfunction** within many municipalities and a lack of integration between district and local municipalities.
3. The DDM proposes a greater form of centralised governance in its approach to development plans. **The DA believes in promoting federalism and greater local government autonomy,** alongside a more targeted approach to address the underlying causes of mismanagement and corruption.
- 4. The DA believes that an overhaul of local government structure is not needed to improve municipalities.** What is required are competent human resources: the increased professionalisation of public service and merit-based appointments.

Failing Local Municipalities

South Africa remains a highly unequal society. Three decades of governance failures and corruption have entrenched deep societal inequalities. Around 20 percent of South Africans live in extreme poverty – below the national food poverty line² – and the proportion of South Africans living below the food poverty line has remained unchanged since at least 2008³.

The decay in service delivery is seen most clearly at the local government level. Local municipalities are primarily responsible for delivering services. They have a constitutional mandate to provide water, electricity, sanitation, waste management, and infrastructure development and maintenance. These services have not been adequately provided to many South Africans for decades.

The local government landscape is characterised by failing service delivery and officials who lack the appropriate financial skills and competencies to perform their functions effectively.⁴ The National Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs' ("COGTA") 2023 State of Local Government Report indicates that out of the 257 municipalities¹, 30 are categorised as stable, 54 as low-risk, 107 as medium-risk, and 66 as dysfunctional. The 66 dysfunctional municipalities represent a quarter of South Africa's municipalities.⁵

If local government is not stabilised, more municipalities may join the 41 municipalities placed under administration since 2016.⁶ Placing municipalities under administration occurs through invoking Section 139 of the Constitution, which permits the provincial² or national³ executive to intervene in municipalities. This is done ostensibly to "*impose a recovery plan aimed at securing the municipality's ability to meet its obligations to provide basic services or its financial commitments*".⁷

Most of these municipalities have been placed under administration repeatedly and tend to relapse into their dysfunctional state.⁸ Of the 41 municipalities under administration, only 12 have been placed under administration once. North West Province is particularly dire – three of its municipalities have been placed under administration six or more times, including Ditsobotla, which has been placed under administration *eight* times.⁹


¹Divvied up as: 8 metros, 44 district, and 205 local municipalities.

ⁱⁱSubsection 139(1), (4), (5).

ⁱⁱⁱSubsection 139(7).

A concerning development is the **ever-growing number** of municipalities placed under administration. It is important to emphasise that instituting administration is done as a measure of last resort. It requires considerable time and resources from provincial governments. The increase in municipalities being placed under administration is indicative of accelerating municipal decay. There were more cases of municipalities being placed under administration in 2022 than in the entire 2016-2020 period combined.¹⁰

Figure 1: The number of municipalities placed under administration since 2016. Data retrieved from Daily Maverick.¹¹



The year 2022 was an outlier in terms of instituting administration, but the general trend of more municipalities' needing administration is worsening. It should be noted that of the 12 municipalities placed under administration that year, 11 had been under administration before, indicating that the collapse had occurred long before 2022.¹² Moreover, given that particular year – just after COVID-19 lockdown restrictions eased in South Africa and the National State of Disaster was lifted – it is reasonable to assume that the provincial executive only managed to institute administration after the lockdown had ended. The spike, therefore, indicates the devastating effects that COVID-19 had on local municipalities. The pandemic tested local government resilience, and many could simply not cope with the increased financial strain.

Intergovernmental Frameworks: DDM and JDMA

The dire state of our municipalities provides context for the formulation of the DDM by COGTA, as well as the Joint District and Metro Approach (“**JDMA**”) by the Western Cape Department of Local Government (“**DLG**”). These are examples of Intergovernmental Relations (“**IGR**”) frameworks, which aim to improve municipal function through coordination brought about by IGRs.

The DDM is a centralised intergovernmental framework for the “*coordination of development priorities within district and metropolitan spaces.*”¹³ The coordination is facilitated by One Plans, which require contributions from all spheres of government, using forums outlined in the DDM Regulations.¹⁴ The plans are centred around key development priorities, particularly service delivery. The One Plans will be implemented at various technical hubs and in each district through a chain of “DDM Champions,” including the President, National Executive members, and Provincial Premiers.¹⁵

The JDMA is a different IGR framework. It aims to dismantle the silo patterns between municipalities and enable long-term, sustainable service delivery, when applicable to physical, capital infrastructure projects. It was piloted in several district municipalities in the Western Cape. The JDMA uses the District Coordinating Forum (“**DCF**”) to coordinate budgets, planning, and monitoring between municipalities with shared deliverable outcomes

The JDMA differs from the DDM in two main respects: 1) it does not use regulations to enforce its mandate and 2) it does not propose centralised development plans. The JDMA identifies the need for coordinating forums for projects that require national, provincial and municipal governments, and that alignment between these three spheres is sometimes necessary. For example, large-scale projects, such as environmental and disaster management, or the physical planning of capital infrastructure projects (e.g. a new school and its location relative to a hospital), require alignment. These projects require proper IGR and are to be implemented on a case-by-case basis, using the DCF and other existing forums. It does not, however, advocate for a permanent, overarching, centralised superstructure to enforce IGR when not relevant.

The key problem with the DDM framework is that it misdiagnoses the root cause of municipal dysfunction: inappropriately skilled or unqualified personnel in key roles, financial mismanagement, and corruption. In short, municipalities and service delivery rely on good human resources. It is not due to a lack of a centralised management structure. This and other flaws with the DDM are detailed below.

Challenges with the DDM

The DDM's central argument is that centralising power under the auspices of oversight will achieve better municipal performance. It is further suggested that municipalities are failing because there is insufficient oversight. This, however, is not true. Municipalities are heavily regulated at present. *The Municipal Finance Management Act ("MFMA")*, *Municipal Systems Act*, *Municipal Structures Act*, and the oversight of the Auditor-General create an exhaustive system of checks and balances.¹⁶ The DA is staunchly opposed to the DDM for several reasons, which are detailed below.

The DA objects to the DDM on **1) Legal**, **2) Bureaucratic**, and **3) Practical** grounds. The main objections are:

1. The DDM violates the Constitution and undermines the executive authority of municipalities (legal).
2. The DDM undermines the Principle of Subsidiarity (legal).
3. The DDM duplicates existing administrative processes (bureaucratic).
4. The DDM adds unnecessary layers of bureaucracy without clear benefits (bureaucratic).
5. The DDM's three pilot sites have shown little demonstrable progress despite costing the taxpayer over R100 million over the last five years (practical failure).¹⁷

The DDM's proposed mechanisms are problematic and leave the underlying causes of municipal failures unaddressed. The most fundamental cause of municipal failure is a lack of adequate human resources: qualified, dedicated, and professional staff. The DDM framework does not address these issues.

Any references to "**the Regulations**" or "**DDM Regulations**" are in relation to *Government Notice, gazette no. 50645, Regulations Framing Institutionalisation of District Development Model in Terms of Section 47(1)(B) Of Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005*.¹⁸

Legal

1. Unconstitutionality and Inconsistency

The Constitution, section 156(1)(a), provides municipalities with executive authority over municipal planning, as articulated in *Schedule 4B*.¹⁹ It does not endow provincial or national executives with executive authority over municipal planning. However, Sections 155(6)(a) and (7) allow for the support for and monitoring of the effective performance of municipal functions, respectively, by the provincial or national executive. **The DDM oversteps the Constitutional provisions in terms of support and monitoring**, as One Plans are expected to be undertaken by all three spheres

of government, and the national executive must approve the plans. This undermines the local government's executive authority over municipal planning.

More specifically, Sections 10(2) and 11(5), (6) and (7) of the Regulations explicitly provide Provincial Executive Councils, the COGTA Minister, and Cabinet the power to adopt (and as a corollary, veto) One Plan proposals. The provision of this authority over municipal planning is inconsistent with the Constitution: local municipalities should have the final say over their municipal planning. The DDM instead places the final say with the Provincial or National Government.

A second unconstitutional part of the Regulations, in Section 7(1), is the stipulation that Provincial Premiers must establish provincial intergovernmental forums. Section 21(1) of the *Intergovernmental Framework Relations Act 13 of 2005* allows Premiers to do this, but it does not mandate that they do so. The Regulations are part of the *Intergovernmental Framework Relations Act*, and one part of the legislation states that Premiers have the choice to establish intergovernmental forums, while the other says they must do so. These provisions are, therefore, inconsistent with each other.

Section 11(5) of the Regulations allows municipal function to be overridden by the COGTA Minister by granting them the power to determine whether or not a local government's One Plan is adopted. This formalised consolidation of power at a national government level is contrary to the spirit of cooperation that should be the foundation of IGRs.

2. Undermining Principle of Subsidiarity

This principle states that decisions affecting local communities should be made at the most local level possible. This enables municipal autonomy and effective management of issues by those who best understand local contexts. The DDM, despite having each district develop its own One Plan, takes a top-down approach to local government by allocating powers upwards, allowing provincial or national governments to veto the One Plan.

Bureaucratic

3. Duplication of Frameworks

The One Plan framework, as conceptualised in the DDM, is redundant given the existence of Integrated Development Plans ("IDPs"). **Municipalities are already required to develop IDPs, as mandated by Chapter 5 of the Municipal Systems Act.**²⁰ One Plans in the Regulations, Section 10(4)(5), do not replace IDPs. They are stipulated to be complementary to them and to align with them. However, this amounts to, at best, a duplication of frameworks. The National Development Plan ("NDP") already mandates IDP alignment.²¹ While this function can be improved, there is no requirement for an additional framework to do so. The provision for IDPs and municipal alignment already exists. Instead, what is needed is smoother integration between municipalities within districts, using municipal IDPs to identify key challenges. What is not needed is a parallel framework that creates a further administrative burden. By imposing this burden, One Plans in the Regulations would ultimately harm the efficient implementation of the IDP plans and further erode service delivery.

Additionally, COGTA and National Treasury have already sent out technical consultants to assist municipalities in developing turnaround plans.²² These are essentially “miniature One Plans”. They have been a clear duplication of functions in the past and failed to improve municipalities.²³

If municipalities fail to follow their IDPs, the imposition of further administrative processes will not resolve this issue. This will only serve to lengthen timeframes and impact resource availability, and local municipalities will suffer further as a result.

4. Bloated Management Structure

Chapter 3 of the Regulations details the bureaucratic structure envisioned for implementing One Plans under the DDM. There are:

- Several DDM “Champions” (The President, appointed national champions, provincial champions, MECs as other provincial champions, mayors as district champions).
- Several committees established for DDM: Presidential Steering Committee, President’s Coordinating Council, and the COGTA Director-General’s Implementation Coordinating Committee.
- Additionally, the Department of Cooperative Governance and the Department of Planning (“**DCoG**”), Monitoring and Evaluations (“**DPME**”) are supposed to establish DDM technical hubs in selected districts, consisting of teams with critical skills and knowledge as technical support agents.

The proposed administrative structure presents feasibility challenges. Many committees and important-sounding roles exist, but these do not substantially change the situation on the ground. While resources are spent establishing hubs, hiring technical expertise, and paying more senior salaries, local municipalities are likely to decay further.

Practical Failures

5. Empirical Cases: The Failure of DDM Pilot Sites

Since 2019, the DDM has been piloted in three sites: the **eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal, the OR Tambo District Municipality in the Eastern Cape, and the Waterberg District Municipality in Limpopo.**²⁴

An analysis of the financial state of the three pilot sites since 2019 shows that the DDM plans have not been successful:

- eThekweni has quadrupled its municipal debt between 2019 and 2024, from approximately R5 billion to R20 billion.^{25,26}
- Waterberg has lapsed its clean audit record, from clean to unqualified with findings, and has regressed in its ability to meet financial obligations since 2019.²⁷ The latest audit (2022/23) saw Waterberg in an R18 million deficit, having already spent 10 percent of the following year’s

budget.²⁸

- OR Tambo Municipality was placed under provincial administration in 2021 after the local council was dissolved due to corruption and maladministration.^{29,30}

The implementation of DDM in practice, even at a small-scale level, has failed for several reasons:

5.1. No actual implementation of One Plans

COGTA has spent approximately R100 million in the last five years on the three pilots. The DDM has supposedly completed its institutionalisation phase (April 2021 – March 2025).³¹ The R100 million was reportedly spent on developing One Plans, staffing costs, and other “framework and plans” development.³² However, there has been very little implementation of any plans.³³ Considering the failure to implement One Plans in three pilot municipalities, it is unreasonable to think the DDM model, as outlined in the Regulations, can be rolled out to all 257 municipalities in a way that tangibly improves service delivery.

5.2. Insufficient IGR

Despite the lofty ideals of integrating the three spheres of government, a key reason for the failure of any meaningful DDM impact is the lack of input from national departments themselves.³⁴ The DPME reported at the end of 2023 that there was poor participation from key national departments and that any inputs provided were mostly for annual programmes, which did not adequately serve the purpose of realising the objectives of One Plans as long-term intergovernmental plans.

It is peculiar that a framework designed to improve IGR finds its greatest challenge in insufficient IGR. The central concept of the DDM is that national executive engagement, oversight, and unilateral authority will help ailing municipalities. Their lack of engagement, therefore, undermines the DDM’s entire project. Even if the DDM’s proposed IGR frameworks were sound on paper, it is evident at this early stage, from the lack of engagement, that they will not happen in practice.

The real solution to improving local government performance will lie in the ability of those at the ground level to communicate their needs seamlessly through the command chain. This is not being done at the DDM pilot sites. A study by researchers at the University of KwaZulu-Natal involved interviewing 16 representatives of various municipalities in five South African provinces.³⁵ The study results found that the DDM has not been carefully institutionalised in municipal settings since its inception in 2019. Municipal officials believe it is a complex plan requiring extensive expertise, which many municipalities do not have, and would need to be supported by appropriate financial resources.³⁶ It is clear from the three pilot municipalities how difficult institutionalisation will be – spending R100 million on preparatory planning is not the solution to address the already overburdened municipal (and national) fiscus.

Local government autonomy has already been diluted by prevailing political arrangements and party structures, which are inherently hierarchical. As a result, more prominence is given to provincial (rather than local) leaders and officials, local issues are “nationalised”, and there

is a lack of fiscal decentralisation, leaving municipalities under-resourced and unable to sustain themselves financially.³⁷ This is already the case, even *without* DDM. DDM will exacerbate these problems and further worsen service delivery. **Given the myriad of problems with the DDM and the failure of its existing implementation, it is reasonable to conclude that the real reason for its proposal is power creep.**

Proposed DDM Regulation Amendments

The objection on Constitutional grounds is straightforward to fix: the Regulations' wording can be amended so they do not violate municipal autonomy. Specifically, the following amendments to the DDM regulations would sufficiently address the concerns:

- **Amendment to Regulation 10 (2): Context of One Plans**

Current wording:

"A One Plan must be developed, endorsed and approved within a 12-month period since the commencement of its review."

Proposed wording:

"A One Plan must be developed and noted within a 12-month period since the commencement of its review."

- **Amendment to Regulation 11 (5): Preparation, Approval, and Adoption of One Plans**

Current wording:

"Each Provincial Executive Council, following consultation with the relevant intergovernmental forums as pronounced in these regulations, must recommend the One Plan for approval in writing to the Minister."

Proposed wording:

"Each Provincial Executive Council, following consultation with the relevant intergovernmental forums as pronounced in these regulations, must recommend the One Plan for noting in writing to the Minister."

- **Amendment to Regulation 11 (6): Submission to Cabinet**

Current wording:

“The Minister must, within one month of receipt thereof, submit the approved One Plan to Cabinet for adoption.”

Proposed wording:

“The Minister must, within one month of receipt thereof, submit the noted One Plan to Cabinet for noting.”

- **Amendment to Regulation 11 (7): Implementation**

Current wording:

“All three spheres of government and organs of state must implement the One Plan adopted by Cabinet.”

Proposed wording:

“All three spheres of government and organs of state must cooperate to implement the One Plan noted by Cabinet.”

However, even if the DDM Regulations were updated to reflect the amendments proposed above, the other four objections would remain. Fundamentally, the DDM model does not address the main cause of municipal dysfunction, a point that is expanded upon below.

Solutions to Municipal Dysfunction

The true failure of the DDM is that it does not identify the root causes of the problem: the lack of merit-based appointments and professional public service. This means that the DDM will not solve these underlying issues. There are case-specific examples where an IGR mechanism, like the JDMA, would improve service delivery by sharing resources and unifying delivery goals. However, this requires the root causes to be addressed, which the DDM will not do.

Making structural changes to the local government model will not solve municipal dysfunction unless the underlying political and implementation challenges that continue to plague municipalities are addressed. It generally takes a local government seven years to stabilise after a restructuring.³⁸ Constant restructuring of local government has started to break down institutional stability within municipalities. Therefore, any further changes must have as little impact as possible on municipalities’ administrative systems and functioning.³⁹ The DDM does not take cognisance of this fact. It aims to radically restructure local government administrative systems without addressing corruption and poor governance.

The dysfunction in local government does not result from a legislative vacuum or insufficient centralised oversight. It is primarily a result of failure to adhere to prudent financial management and a lack of merit-based, professionalised appointees. Most municipalities do not secure clean audits, with only 34 out of 257 municipalities having received this audit opinion in 2023.⁴⁰ Financial mismanagement takes the form of gross misspending, sub-optimal allocation, and outright theft of municipal funds.^{41,42,43} Municipal audit results continue to decline, with annual irregular and wasteful expenditure reaching R7.4 billion in 2023.⁴⁴ If a municipality's leadership and staff are unqualified, and funds are constantly misused or not utilised to improve municipal infrastructure, there will be no tangible improvements in service delivery. The DDM cannot and will not fix this underlying issue.



Adding to this is the culture of a complete lack of political accountability. Accountability is undermined by cadre deployment, a lack of political will, and inadequate capacitation. Adding another layer of oversight through the DDM does not address these root causes; it merely shifts accountability away from communities and their elected representatives to a faceless bureaucracy in Pretoria. As South Africans have learnt in the past two decades, theoretical oversight does not equate to actual accountability. An example is the number of ANC members rewarded with MP posts for destroying their provinces and municipalities.⁴⁵ Municipal managers who ignore audit findings, politicians who shield corrupt officials, and national leaders who fail to capacitate municipalities are the true culprits of municipal dysfunction.

Strengthening existing mechanisms by capacitating municipal administrations, enforcing compliance with the MFMA, and holding corrupt officials accountable is necessary. Municipalities must be empowered, not stripped of their autonomy, and their councils must be strengthened, not bypassed.

A Good Governance Africa report in 2024 demonstrates that the DA approach – merit-based hiring, an emphasis on good performance, and skilled civil service – leads to better local municipal performance. The study gave municipalities and provinces a weighted rating based on the following criteria: administration and governance; economic development; leadership and management; planning, monitoring, and evaluation; and service delivery (weighted most). **Based on these, the DA-led Western Cape received the highest provincial rating (4.11/5) and the highest service delivery satisfaction rating.**⁴⁷ The ratings are shown in Figure 2.


The DA-led Cape Town also received the highest rating of the eight metros analysed. This is shown in Figure 3. Category B municipalities in the Western Cape also consistently topped the Government Performance Index (“**GPI**”) rating.⁴⁸ DA-led areas consistently exhibit good governance, characterised by responsible economic management and a culture of competency and accountability. If someone is not fulfilling their duties, they are replaced with someone who can.

Figure 2: Provincial governance index ratings and municipal governance satisfaction.⁴⁹
The red bar is the average score for all provinces.



Source: GGA (2024); HSRC (2023)

Figure 3: Metropolitan municipality governance index ratings. ⁵⁰



Source: GGA (2024)

Conclusion

In summary, the DA believes the DDM is a **highly flawed model**. The DDM fails to address the underlying issues behind municipal failure, including poor fiscal management, unqualified staff, and corruption. DA-led municipalities already provide better services to their people without national oversight or a new piece of legislative superstructure. The JDMA can further improve on this foundation, aligning IGR plans for projects which require all three governmental spheres, a framework already stipulated by the NDP.

The DA will continue to demonstrate its adherence to good governance principles and create a local government that is close to the people, responsive to their needs, and accountable for its actions.

End Notes

¹The proposed regulations can be found here: https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of-district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486.

²As defined in the Stats SA National Poverty Lines publication: <https://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03101/P031012024.pdf>.

³See the World Bank report on South Africa: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bae48ff2fefc5a869546775b3f010735-0500062021/related/mpo-zaf.pdf>.

⁴Maréve Biljohn, Grey Magaiza (2024). Reimagining local government service delivery through the quadruple helix. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383562415_Reimagining_local_government_service_delivery_through_the_quadruple_helix.

⁵COGTA 2023 State of Local Government Report: <https://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/docs/state-of-local-government-progress-on-the-implementation-of-municipal-support-and-improvement-plans-msip/>.

⁶Business Tech Report (2024). The worst run municipalities in South Africa: <https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/794767/the-worst-run-municipalities-in-south-africa/>.

⁷Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, chapter 6, section 139. Available at: <https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-chapter-6-provinces-07-feb-1997#139.%20Provincial%20intervention%20in%20local%20government>.

⁸Maréve Biljohn, Grey Magaiza (2024). Reimagining local government service delivery through the quadruple helix. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/383562415_Reimagining_local_government_service_delivery_through_the_quadruple_helix.

⁹Business Tech Report (2024). The worst run municipalities in South Africa: <https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/794767/the-worst-run-municipalities-in-south-africa/>.

¹⁰COGTA 2023 State of Local Government Report: <https://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/docs/state-of-local-government-progress-on-the-implementation-of-municipal-support-and-improvement-plans-msip/>.

¹¹COGTA 2023 State of Local Government Report: <https://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/docs/state-of-local-government-progress-on-the-implementation-of-municipal-support-and-improvement-plans-msip/>.

¹²COGTA 2023 State of Local Government Report: <https://www.cogta.gov.za/index.php/docs/state-of-local-government-progress-on-the-implementation-of-municipal-support-and-improvement-plans-msip/>.

¹³Government Gazette (published 10th May 2024): <https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of->

[district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486.](#)

¹⁴Government Gazette (published 10th May 2024): [https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of-district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486.](https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of-district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486)

¹⁵Government Gazette (published 10th May 2024): [https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of-district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486.](https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of-district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486)

¹⁶Auditor General Municipal Audit report for 2022/23: [https://mfma-2023.agsareports.co.za/.](https://mfma-2023.agsareports.co.za/)

¹⁷News24 (2024). After 4 years and R100m to fix broken municipalities, a lot of plans are in place, says Cogta: [https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/after-4-years-and-r100m-to-fix-broken-municipalities-a-lot-of-plans-are-in-place-says-cogta-20230502.](https://www.news24.com/news24/politics/after-4-years-and-r100m-to-fix-broken-municipalities-a-lot-of-plans-are-in-place-says-cogta-20230502)

¹⁸Government Gazette (published 10th May 2024): [https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of-district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486.](https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/intergovernmental-relations-framework-act-13-2005-regulations-framing-institutionalisation-of-district-development-model-in-terms-of-section-47-1-b-of-intergovernmental-relations_20240510-GGN-50645-02486)

¹⁹Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, schedule 4B. Available at: [https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-chapter-6-provinces-07-feb-1997#139.%20Provincial%20intervention%20in%20local%20government.](https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-chapter-6-provinces-07-feb-1997#139.%20Provincial%20intervention%20in%20local%20government)

²⁰Government Gazette (published 13th February 2004): [https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a56-03.pdf.](https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a56-03.pdf)

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